Nino’s Deliberative Democracy in the Dock: A Discourse Failure Critique

Authors

  • David C. Crosby University of Arizona

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.33423/jabe.v22i13.3908

Keywords:

business, economics, democracy, deliberation, discourse failure, public choice economics, special interest groups, majority rule, super majority rule, public goods legislation, redistributive legislation

Abstract

In this essay, I critique Nino’s (1996) view that a democratic majority rule framework best secures impartial consideration of citizens’ interests through deliberative epistemic and moral virtues that lead to the enactment of impartialist policies. Pincione and Teson’s (2006) discourse failure hypothesis, as well as evidence from public economics, show democratic deliberation is self-defeating, due to partialist group interests that distort deliberative democratic discourse, and, in turn, leads to the enactment of partialist legislation. I conclude that impartialist policies are better secured by a constitutional amendment limiting majority rule to public goods legislation and requiring super majority rule for redistributive legislation.

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Published

2020-12-20

How to Cite

Crosby, D. C. (2020). Nino’s Deliberative Democracy in the Dock: A Discourse Failure Critique. Journal of Applied Business and Economics, 22(13). https://doi.org/10.33423/jabe.v22i13.3908

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Section

Articles